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On households and unemployment insurance
Sekyu Choi
Department of Economics, University of Bristol
Arnau Valladares-Esteban
Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen
We study unemployment insurance in a framework where the main source of het-
erogeneity among agents is the type of household they live in: some agents live
alone while others live with their spouses as a family. Our exercise is motivated by
the fact that married individuals can rely on spousal income to smooth labor mar-
ket shocks, while singles cannot. We extend a version of the standard incomplete-
markets model to include two-agent households and calibrate it to the US econ-
omy with special emphasis on matching differences in labor market transitions
across gender and marital status as well as aggregate wealth moments. Our central
finding is that changes to the current unemployment insurance program are val-
ued differently by married and single households. In particular, a more generous
unemployment insurance reduces the welfare of married households significantly
more than that of singles and vice versa. We show that this result is driven by the
amount of self-insurance existing in married households, and thus, we highlight
the interplay between self- and government-provided insurance and its implica-
tion for policy.
Keywords. Households, marriage, family, unemployment, unemployment insur-
ance, worker flows, heterogeneous agents.
JEL classification. D91, E24, J64, J65.
1. Introduction
This paper studies the welfare effects of publicly provided Unemployment Insurance
(UI) in an environment where the main source of heterogeneity among individuals is
the type of household they live in: some agents live alone while others live with their
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spouses as a family. While the standard framework used to study the effects of UI focuses
on single-agent models, this paper provides a more complete picture because of three
reasons. First, as pointed out in Choi and Valladares-Esteban (2017), married and sin-
gle individuals display striking differences in labor market dynamics and performance,
even after controlling for observable differences.1 Married individuals have lower un-
employment rates than their single counterparts, suggesting that the two groups may
have different needs with respect to UI. Second, the family can be an important source
of insurance since, when one family member is laid off, the other can start working to
smooth consumption. Third, labor supply decisions might depend on the presence of a
spouse in the household and the economic situation of this spouse. Hence, the aggre-
gate labor supply response to a change in UI can mask rich heterogeneity in the reaction
of different groups of people.
The framework we use here extends the Aiyagari–Bewley-Huggett economy in
Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson, and Şahin (2017).2 In our model, households decide la-
bor supply along the extensive margin, agents are subject to noninsurable income and
working opportunity shocks, cannot borrow, and can only save using a risk-free asset.
Moreover, there is exogenous heterogeneity in terms of gender and marital status. Mar-
ried agents make joint decisions within a unitary framework and pool income, con-
sumption, and savings.3 The unemployment insurance program is run by a government
that taxes labor income and keeps a balanced budget. Finally, the model accounts for
general equilibrium in aggregate prices.
To discipline the model, we use a sample of the Current Population Survey for the US
economy where we remove the influence of observable characteristics (with the excep-
tion of gender and marital status) as well as other common issues found in the literature,
such as time aggregation bias and misclassification of labor market states.4 We also dis-
cipline the model in terms of the overall heterogeneity in the distribution of assets across
households of different gender and marital status. The model is not only able to account
for the monthly transitions across labor market states and the labor market stocks asso-
ciated to these transitions, it also generates realistic outcomes for overall asset inequality
and matches facts regarding the “added worker effect.”5
Our main quantitative exercise with the model consists in modifying the level of
unemployment benefits (funded through income taxes) and computing household-
specific welfare changes across different steady-state economies.6 Our central finding is
1Throughout this paper, the terms single and nonmarried are used interchangeably, referring to any per-
son who is labeled as “never married,” “separated,” “divorced,” or “widowed” in the Current Population
Survey (CPS). We ignore cohabiting individuals, given the inability to distinguish them in a nonarbitrary
way.
2See Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993).
3Throughout our analysis, we take marital status as exogenous. Some authors focus on the explicit rela-
tionship between marriage decisions and labor market risk. See, for example, Gould and Paserman (2003),
Hess (2004), Gemici and Laufer (2011), Knowles (2013), and Santos and Weiss (2016).
4See the details in Choi and Valladares-Esteban (2017).
5See Lundberg (1985) as the inception of the literature on the “added worker effect.”
6We focus on comparing steady states as we are interested in understanding the role that the family plays
determining welfare rather than a strict policy evaluation of the current UI system. Joseph and Weitzenblum
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that the welfare responses to changes in the generosity of the UI are significantly differ-
ent between single and married households because of the role of the family. Increasing
unemployment benefits leads, in the steady state, to higher welfare loses for married
households than for singles and vice versa. In several counterfactual experiments, we
show that this result does not depend on the fact that married households face less un-
employment risk than singles, nor that married households hold more assets, nor that
the UI program redistributes from married to single households. Our interpretation of
these results is that married households value UI much less than singles because of the
insurance already provided by the family. We also show that the employment and unem-
ployment rates of married and single agents respond differently to changes in the gen-
erosity of the UI. That is, the response of the aggregate labor market stocks to changes
in UI masks rich heterogeneity in the responses of agents by gender and marital status.
There is a vast literature that studies the welfare implications of unemployment in-
surance programs. Some authors have focused on representative-agent models which
highlight a few of the many relevant trade-offs related to UI provision in order to charac-
terize the optimal UI. Shavell and Weiss (1979) study the welfare-maximizing sequence
of benefits when the behavior of unemployed workers affects the job-finding proba-
bility and the public sector cannot monitor choices of the unemployed. Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997) model a repeated principal-agent problem with a risk-averse un-
employed agent and a risk-neutral principal who cannot monitor the agent’s search ef-
fort. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001) set up a model with worker-firm bargaining over
wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort. Shimer and Werning (2008)
highlighted the role of unemployment insurance as a liquidity provision device. Lentz
(2009) estimated a job search model using a rich database on wealth and labor market
outcomes to anchor the role of assets in the search behavior of the unemployed.
Other authors have studied the effects of unemployment insurance in models with a
matching technology between vacancies and workers. Nakajima (2012) looked at the ef-
fect of extending the UI on the unemployment rate. Jung and Kuester (2015) studied op-
timal labor market policies throughout the business cycle. Vejlin (2017) highlighted the
role of the demand for labor when studying the optimality of the UI. Landais, Michaillat,
and Saez (2018a, 2018b) characterized the optimal unemployment insurance in a class
of matching models and evaluate the UI in place in the United States relative to their
framework taking into account the policy changes that occur in booms and recessions.
Our paper is also connected to the strand of the literature that studies unemploy-
ment insurance in heterogeneous agent models with incomplete markets. Hansen and
Imrohoroğlu (1992) used a model with exogenous heterogeneity in employment shocks
and a moral hazard problem between the unemployed and the public sector. Gomes,
Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) studied a search-theoretic model embedded into an
Aiyagari–Bewley–Huggett economy with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to job op-
portunities. Pallage and Zimmermann (2001) studied the distributional effects of the UI
by analyzing which type of agents would support different changes to the UI. Abdulka-
diroğlu, Kuruşçu, and Şahin (2002) extended the model of Hansen and Imrohoroğlu
(2003) used a more tractable model to show that the transition path can be relevant for understanding the
welfare implications of changes in the UI.
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(1992) to study the implications of hidden assets. Wang and Williamson (2002) analyzed
a dynamic model with moral hazard in which agents make unobservable effort decisions
both when employed and when unemployed, thus affecting both the job-losing and job-
finding margins. Young (2004) revisited the analysis in Wang and Williamson (2002) to
include the welfare implications along the transition path. Pollak (2007) investigated the
distributional effects of moving to an optimal UI scheme taking into account transition
dynamics. Mukoyama (2013) extended the analysis in Krusell, Mukoyama, and Şahin
(2010) to include transition dynamics and decomposes the welfare effects of a reform
that increases permanently the benefit level of the UI. Lifschitz, Setty, and Yedid-Levi
(2018) extended the model in Krusell, Mukoyama, and Şahin (2010) with exogenous het-
erogeneity in skill and the productivity process in order to find the optimal level of UI.
Much less work has been done on the effects of unemployment insurance in frame-
works where the family plays an important role, although there are some exceptions.
The closest study to ours is Ortigueira and Siassi (2013), who use an Aiyagari–Bewley–
Huggett economy to analyze the amount of insurance provided by married households
against non-employment risks. Our analysis differs from theirs in several dimensions.
Our model accounts for the labor stocks and transitions across employment, unem-
ployment, and nonparticipation associated with the four types of individuals considered
(single females, single males, married females, and married males). Also, the UI system
we consider incorporates a past-employment requirement resembling one of the eligi-
bility conditions existing in the US system. This element plays an important role in the
employment decisions of the agents.
Some other authors have also analyzed unemployment insurance in multiagent en-
vironments. Ek and Holmlund (2010) studied optimal unemployment insurance of cou-
ples in a Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides framework. Our paper differs from their work
in two dimensions. First, we do not consider unemployment benefits as the outside op-
tion of a worker in a bargaining process and, second, the model used here is able to
account for multiple moments of the data associated with the different labor market dy-
namics between singles and married individuals in the US economy. Di Tella and Mac-
Culloch (2002) studied the provision of unemployment insurance in a context where
agents form networks to share risk (these networks are what they consider families). We
consider the family as the union generated by the contract of marriage and we abstract
from commitment issues between spouses. Moreover, instead of a theoretical approach,
we propose a quantitative exercise to test the effect of public intervention.
Although single-agent environments are predominant in quantitative macroeco-
nomic and public policy analysis, there is a growing literature which is moving toward
two-agent frameworks. Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) studied the welfare impli-
cations of changes in the US tax code in a model where decisions are taken by two-earner
households. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010) explored the quantitative and
welfare implications of the rise in the college premium, the narrowing of the gender
wage gap, and the increase of wage volatility using a model in which the decision unit
is a two-agent household. Hong and Ríos-Rull (2007) analyzed social security with two-
member households. Kleven, Kreiner, and Saez (2009) studied optimal taxation model-
ing explicitly second-earner decisions.
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This paper is also related to the literature that studies household interactions and
frictions in the labor market. Mankart and Oikonomou (2016) showed that a household
search model can account for some regularities of the US data that cannot be replicated
by single-agent search models. Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2012) theoretically ana-
lyzed a McCall (1970)-type search problem for a two-member household, under differ-
ent types of preferences. Dey and Flinn (2008) studied the implications of health insur-
ance coverage in a search model where the decision unit is the household. Flabbi and
Mabli (2018) analyzed the bias in structurally estimated parameters in search models
where the misspecification is related to joint-search.
2. The model
Time is discrete and the time horizon is infinite. The economy is populated by a contin-
uum of infinitely lived households with total mass equal to one. There are agents of two
genders, females (f ) and males (m). Agents may live alone, in single households (S) or
with their spouse, in married households (M).
Single households can be composed of either one female or one male agent, while
married households consist of two members, one of each gender. Hence, there are four
types of agents: single females (S f ), single males (Sm), married females (M f ), and
married males (Mm). A fraction Sf of the households corresponds to single females,
a fraction Sm to single males, and the rest (1 −Sf −Sm =M) are married house-
holds.7 We assume household type and gender to be exogenous.
Households discount the future at rate 0 < β < 1, derive utility from consumption
streams over time and suffer a utility cost when working or when searching for a job: this
is represented by parameters {αSgαMg} and {γSgγMg} for g ∈ {fm}, respectively.
We further assume that if the two members of a married household work at the same
time, an extra utility cost (αM) is incurred, which may reflect child care needs or missed
home production. The disutility of job search is assumed to be an i.i.d. random variable,
in order to capture the high level of transitions between unemployment and inactivity
status observed in the data. Notice that our assumptions imply that there only exists an
extensive margin of labor supply in our economy.
We use the notion of unitary households when we model the decision-making pro-
cess of married couples.8 This assumption implies that the utilities of both members
of the household coincide, which can be interpreted as both the husband and the wife
being perfectly altruistic between each other. This assumption is not without loss of gen-
erality. On the one hand, it is easy to implement and provides us with a clear notion of
welfare for individuals inside married households. On the other hand, it implies that
levels of consumption insurance across household members are maximized.
With respect to consumption, preferences are different across single and married
households. For singles, it is a standard log utility, log(c), while for married households,
7We make appropriate adjustments, for example, when we account for total population as opposed to
just households.
8See Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2010), Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012), and Domeij and
Klein (2013) for similar setups using this assumption.
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Our assumption above implies that consumption is a public good adjusted by an
adult equivalence factor φ. Within married households, the individual disutilities of
working (αMg) and searching (γMg) are suffered by the household as a whole (follow-
ing the unitary assumption). Additionally, we assume that married households need to
sacrifice some consumption each period, in the form of a consumption floor c. This pa-
rameter represents inherent costs of living inside a couple, and its presence introduces
extra risk sensitivity for married households, which helps in matching asset moments.
The individual labor income of any agent in the economy, irrespective of gender or
household type, is given by
(1 − τ)wz
where τ is a linear labor income tax, w is the equilibrium wage rate per efficiency unit of
labor, and z is a random variable representing efficiency units of labor. The idiosyncratic
shock z is also independent of demographics and follows an AR(1) stochastic process
in logs:
logz′ = ρ logz + ε′ (1)
where ρ represents the persistence parameter of the process and ε ∼ N(0σε) is the in-
novation shock in the current period.
Besides the discrete labor supply and search choice, households decide how much to
consume and how much to save for the future. The only technology available for saving
is a risk-free asset which pays a real interest rate r. Households are not allowed to borrow
against future income.
2.1 The labor market
Labor income shocks are not the only source of uncertainty in this economy. To capture
frictions in the labor market, agents are subject to shocks to their working opportuni-
ties that determine whether an agent has the possibility to work or not in a given period.
Hence, individuals can be in three mutually exclusive labor market states: employed, un-
employed, or out of the labor force, which we represent by E, U , and N , respectively. Em-
ployed agents lose their jobs with probability δHg. Agents who are currently not work-
ing, receive job offers with probability λiHg, where i ∈ {NU}. Generically, λNHg < λUHg,
which means that the rate at which agents receive job offers is different whether they
are in the inactive (not searching) or unemployment (searching) state. This is reflected
below, where agents can choose whether to be in either N or U , with the subsequent
consequence on job arrival rates.
The fact that both the job-arrival and the job-losing probabilities depend on gender
and household type captures potential differences among single females, single males,
married females, and married males in the composition of unobservable characteristics
that these groups might present in the data. For example, if there is some unobservable
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characteristic that leads people to both be more likely to get married and less likely to
be unemployed, this parametrization should be able to capture this idea.
Agents in our model may quit their jobs. The decision to work or not, in the case of
single households, is mainly determined by the amount of assets, productivity, and the
unemployment eligibility status of the agent. For married individuals, the labor market
situation of the spouse plays also a very important role along with the factors listed for
singles.
2.2 The government and the unemployment insurance
In this economy, there is a government that taxes labor income, finances an unemploy-
ment insurance program, and balances its budget period by period. We assume that
all agents who are hit by the job-losing probability (δHg) and do not find a new work-
ing opportunity (1 − λHg) are compensated with a transfer b(z) from the government.
Agents who endogenously quit their jobs, are not eligible for this transfer, as are those
who choose to be inactive over unemployed, as in Krusell et al. (2017).
The UI policy is defined by two parameters: a replacement rate b and a benefit cap b.
In case of losing a job, individuals receive either (1 − τ)bwz or (1 − τ)bw as unem-
ployment insurance payments while searching for a new opportunity. The benefit cap
is enforced when bz > b. We also control the length of unemployment benefit eligibil-
ity through a constant probability μ of becoming ineligible. Finally, we assume that the
government collects labor taxes from the entire population at rate τ and gives out lump-
sum transfers in amount T per household. That is, tax revenues are used both to finance
the UI program and the unconditional transfer T .
2.3 Single households
Five factors define the situation of a single household. First, whether the agent in the
household is working or not. Second, the level of assets held by the agent (a). Third,
her/his labor income shock (z), which evolves according to the process described in
equation (1). Fourth, the agent’s eligibility for unemployment benefits in case of not be-
ing at work and, fifth, the realization of the disutility cost of job search γ.
We set up the problem of single households recursively. We denote by Wg, Ug, and Ng
the value function of a single agent of gender g who is employed, unemployed, and out
of the labor force, respectively. The state space for each function is given by {azγ i},
where i is an indicator variable on the eligibility for unemployment benefits.
Using these definitions, we can further define the value of not having a job opportu-
nity as Jg = max{UgNg} and the value of having one, Vg = max{WgJg}. Now, the value
of inactivity can be defined as
Ng(azγ i) = max
ca′≥0
log(c)+βE[λNSgVg(a′ z′γ′ i′) + (1 − λNSg)Jg(a′ z′γ′ i′)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ T
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The value of unemployment is given by
Ug(a zγ i) = max
ca′≥0
log(c)− γSg
+βE[λUSgVg(a′ z′γ′ i′) + (1 − λUSg)Jg(a′ z′γ′ i′)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1 − τ)b(z)i+ T (2)
Note that the difference between the value of inactivity versus the value of unemploy-
ment is given by the i.i.d. variable that represents the disutility cost γSg of searching,
the different job arrival probabilities, and the potential extra income in the form of the
unemployment benefits that those that are jobless (but search for a job) may receive.
For single households, the value of being employed is
Wg(azγ i) = max
ca′≥0
log(c)− αSg









s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1 − τ)wz + T
From this problem, note that employed individuals who receive a separation shock, may
receive a job opportunity within the period at rate λUSg.
As in Krusell et al. (2017), the mapping between model and data in terms of labor
force status is direct: agents who are working in the model are employed. Of those not in
employment, we label as unemployed those who choose to incur the search cost γSg,
while the rest are the inactive population.
2.4 Married households
The state space for married households depends on the working prospects of both mem-
bers of the household, as well as the level of joint savings. Thus, households need to con-
sider {az z∗γγ∗ i i∗} as states, where we use asterisk to denote information from the
second member of the household. Without loss of generality, we take females as the first
member and males as the second member of the household.
Expanding on the notation for single households, the following value functions de-
fine joint labor supply decisions:
JJ
{




az z∗γγ∗ i i∗
} = max{UW NW JJ}
V J
{
az z∗γγ∗ i i∗
} = max{WUW NJJ}
V V
{
az z∗γγ∗ i i∗
} = max{WWW UW NUW NW JJ}
For example, take value JJ: it is the value of a household in which none of the members
has a job opportunity. In that case, they need to decide who looks for a job and who stays
at home. On the other hand, the value JV represents the value for a household where
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the female (first member) is jobless, while the male (second member) can become em-
ployed. The rest of the value functions can be defined accordingly. For exposition, below
we present a subset of the associated bellman equations omitting symmetric cases be-
tween household members.












+βE[λNMf λNMmV V (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′ i′ i∗′)







a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′ i′ i∗′
)
+ (1 − λNMf )(1 − λNMm)JJ(a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′ i′ i∗′)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ T
In this problem, we see that households are subject to twice as many employment
shocks as single households, as seen from the comparison of the term in brackets of
this problem versus the one in equation (2).
The problem of a household where both members are unemployed is given by
UU
(








− γMf − γMm
+βE[λUMf λUMmV V (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′ i′ i∗′)







a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′ i′ i∗′
)
+ (1 − λUMf )(1 − λUMm)JJ(a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′ i′ i∗′)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1 − τ)[b(z)i+ b(z∗)i∗] + T
The main differences between this and the definition of the NN Bellman equations is
the existence of i.i.d. search costs (for the female and the male) and different job arrival
probabilities λUMg.
Next, consider the problem of a household where the first member (female) is work-
ing while the second member (male) is out of the labor force:
WN
(









+βE[(1 − δMf )λNMmV V (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′0 i∗′)
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+ δMf λUMf λNMmV V
(








a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′1 i∗′
)






















× JJ(a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′1 i∗′)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1 − τ)wz + T
The problem where the female is working while the male is unemployed is quite
similar and is given by
WU
(








− αMf − γMm
+βE[(1 − δMf )λUMmV V (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′0 i∗′)
+ δMf λUMf λUMmV V
(








a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′1 i∗′
)






















× JJ(a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′1 i∗′)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1 − τ)[wz + b(z∗)i∗] + T
Finally, consider the value for a household with two working members:
WW
(








− αMf − αMm − αM
+βE[(1 − δMf )(1 − δMm)
× V V (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′00)










× JV (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′10)















× JV (a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′10)




× V J(a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′01)













× JJ(a′ z′ z∗′γ′γ∗′11)]
s.t. c + a′ = (1 + r)a+ (1 − τ)[wz +wz∗] + T
The bracketed term in the problem above shows all possible scenarios a household with
two working members may face next period. Our exposition makes explicit the different
paths in which a two agent household may end up with, for example, two job opportu-
nities, and also how unemployment insurance eligibility changes from case to case. As
mentioned in Section 2.2, only those who experience a job destruction shock are enti-
tled to unemployment insurance payments, thus the eligibility dummy i equals zero in
cases where a member of the household may consider quitting his/her job.
The rest of the Bellman equations are analogous or symmetrical and vary on three
dimensions: disutility costs of working/search, probability trees for each future value
function, and the budget constraint faced by the household.
2.5 Equilibrium
Output in the economy is produced by an aggregate Cobb–Douglas production function
KθL1−θ. In standard fashion, we assume a continuum of competitive firms who hire
capital and efficient units of labor in spot markets, leading to aggregate prices:
r = θKθ−1L1−θ − δK and
w = (1 − θ)KθL−θ
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where K is the weighted sum of assets by all types of households and L is the weighted
sum of supplied efficient units of labor by all types of agents.
As for the government, it manages the unemployment insurance payments, accord-
ing to parameters b (replacement rate), b (cap on unemployment insurance payments),
and μ (hazard probability of UI benefits ending), while taxing labor income at rate τ and
giving transfers T to each household.
Our equilibrium concept is standard. In a steady state, we find the interest rate r,
real wages w, and transfers T , such that aggregate quantities (K and L) are compatible
between the problem of each household and the problem of the representative firm, and
the budget of the government is balanced. This is a simple extension of the equilibrium
concepts in models with only single agents.
3. Mapping the model to US data
A model period is 1 month. The model considers four types of individuals: single fe-
males, single males, married females, and married males. We take their weights from
the data, which in the year 2000 in the US economy, amounts to roughly equal shares of
each group in the population. The objective of our calibration is to match labor market
transitions across different market states for each of the four groups, along other salient
features of the US economy.
We take some parameters directly from Krusell et al. (2017): the AR(1) process for
income shocks (equation (1)) is parameterized using ρ = 0996 and σε = 0096.9 The un-
employment insurance is defined by a replacement rate of b = 023, the cap on benefits
equals b = 0465 of the average wage in the steady state, and the hazard rate of extinc-
tion of UI benefits is set to μ= 1/6. We also set labor taxes to τ = 03 and find the transfer
T which balances the government budget in the steady state equilibrium. The capital-
share parameter in the Cobb–Douglas production function θ is set to 03 and the aggre-
gate depreciation rate is δK = 00067. We use the standard OECD equivalence scale for
households with two adults, thus φ = 17. All the parameters that are set exogenously
are reported in Table 1.
We calibrate β targeting a monthly interest rate of 033%, which amounts to a 4%
annual interest rate. As for household assets, we target the empirical ratio between av-
erage assets of married households to single households of 28482, which in the model
is related to the minimum consumption floor c.10
For each household type in the model, transitions in and out of each labor market
state are determined simultaneously by five parameters: the disutility of work αHg, job
offer probabilities out of unemployment and out of inactivity (λUHg and λ
N
Hg, resp.), the
job-losing probability δHg, and the spread in the variability of the job search cost, a pa-
rameter which we label εγHg. We again follow Krusell et al. (2017) and parameterize the
9We discretize this process using the method in Kopecky and Suen (2010), which is suitable for highly
persistent processes.
10The empirical ratio between average assets of married households to single households is computed
from the data by Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2016), which is available at https://sites.google.com/site/kuhnecon/
home/us-inequality.
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Table 1. Exogenously set parameters.
Symbol Description Value
b Replacement rate of UI 023
b Cap on UI benefits 0465
μ Probability ineligibility of UI 1/6
θ Capital share 03
δK Depreciation rate 00067
τ Labor income tax 03
Sm Fraction of single males 025
Sf Fraction of single females 025
ρ Persistence income shocks 0996
σε S.d. income shocks 0096
φ Equivalence scale consumption 17
search cost variable as a three point distribution. More specifically, we set the distribu-
tion of the search disutility for each household type (H g) to be one of the following
values: {
γHg − εγHgγHgγHg + εγHg
}

where γHg = (35/40)αHg, which reflects time-use information from Mukoyama, Pat-
terson, and Şahin (2018). Although these parameters influence directly transitions for
different households, they interact with asset accumulation and labor supply decisions
to determine transitions, so the above parameters need to be calibrated jointly to match
empirical moments.
For each type of agent, there are nine transition probabilities between employment,
unemployment, and nonparticipation. However, only six of them are independent since
transitions from the same starting state must add up to one. In the model, these six mo-
ments determine the fraction of agents in each state by a simple steady state argument.
In the data, this is a very good approximation, as noted, for example, by Shimer (2012).
Our calibration exercise targets these twenty-four data moments (six transitions times
four types of agents). More specifically, we choose parameter values to minimize the
square difference between model simulated data and the empirical transition moments.
Given a set of parameter values, we solve the model, finding the equilibrium in both
prices and taxes, and simulate a history of 5000 periods for a total of 30,000 agents. From
the simulated data, we compute transition probabilities and other statistics.11
We follow Choi and Valladares-Esteban (2017) to compute labor market transitions
by using monthly data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) controlling for observ-
able characteristics and adjusting for other known empirical issues: we correct the data
for classification errors and time aggregation bias. Transition probabilities are cleaned
from the effect of race, age, census division, education, and the number of children in
the household. We use a subsample from January 2000 to December 2005, because the
unemployment rate, the female labor supply, and the fraction of households in each
11Further details regarding the computation are in Appendix B.
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Table 2. Benchmark calibrated parameter values.
Symbol Description Value
β Discount factor 09950
Single male households
αSm Disutility of work 05185
ε
γ
Sm Dispersion search cost 00433
λuSm Arrival probability unemployed 03178
λnSm Arrival probability OLF 02602
δSm Losing probability 00210
Single female households
αSf Disutility of work 05117
ε
γ
Sf Dispersion search cost 00427
λuSf Arrival probability unemployed 02875
λnSf Arrival probability OLF 02375
δSf Losing probability 00143
Married households
αMm Disutility of work male 01716
αMf Disutility of work female 03620
αM Disutility of joint work 00260
c Consumption floor 17010
ε
γ
Mm Dispersion search cost male 00140
ε
γ
Mf Dispersion search cost female 00304
λuMm Arrival probability unemployed male 07861
λuMf Arrival probability unemployed female 04065
λnMm Arrival probability OLF male 06982
λnMf Arrival probability OLF female 03577
δMm Losing probability male 00266
δMf Losing probability female 00178
household type are stable during that period. Since we consider a steady state frame-
work for our model, this sample period suits us best: there were significant increases in
the supply of labor by females (especially married) from the late 1970s, which stabilized
during the early 2000s.
Table 2 presents all parameter values along a brief description. We separate param-
eters by household type. For singles, the calibration exercise returns values which are
in the ballpark of previous studies, especially for the job-arrival and job-losing proba-
bilities.12 As for married households, we find two nonstandard results: the level of the
consumption floor c is significant at 17010, in an economy where transfers T are 175
and average wages are 302. Second, the job-arrival probability for married males is cal-
ibrated to a high value, at 07886 when unemployed and 07007 when inactive. This pa-
rameterization reflects the fact that married men have high participation rates in the
US economy. In the model, job-arrival rates for married males need to be relatively high
to match the empirical unemployment-to-employment and inactivity-to-employment
transitions for this group. Married males in the model have strong incentives not to
12See Krusell et al. (2017).
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work, given the insurance provided inside the household, both because of the relatively
high level of assets (with respect to singles) and the added worker effect.
4. Model fit
Table 3 compares the performance of the simulated model with the data for single fe-
males while Table 4 does it for single males. Similarly, Table 5 compares the performance
of the model with the data for married females while Table 6 does it for married males.
The model does a good job replicating the data in terms of matching the transitions
between labor market states for different types of household. The model has a especially
good fit for both males and females in married households, and some difficulty to match
some moments for single females, where the model overestimates the unemployment
rate. Since in our model labor supply and job-search decisions are intertwined with
consumption and savings decisions (which are nonlinear) there is no mechanical link
between transition rates and job-arrival and job-losing probabilities (λs and δs, resp.).
Thus, the fact that we can match relatively well all these moments is no minor feat. This
is of special relevance when we think of the problem of married households, where two
sets of employment shocks must be considered, along with a joint asset allocation deci-
sion with a fixed consumption floor.
In terms of aggregate asset accumulation and the endogenous interest rate, the
model also performs well: the interest rate in the model is 038% versus 033% in the
data. As for the ratio of assets between married and single households, the model pro-
duces a value of 241 while the empirical figure (taken from the companion website to
Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2016)) is 285.
In Figure 1, we present the asset distribution in the baseline economy, by marital sta-
tus. The histogram shows that single households are slightly more concentrated toward
zero assets, while average asset accumulation in the married group is higher.
Table 7 shows a comparison between predictions from our model and the data with
respect to some additionally non-targeted statistics. The first one is the overall Gini in-
dex for assets in the economy.13 As it is common in incomplete-markets models, our
model underpredicts overall wealth inequality: the Gini index is 085 in the data versus
073 in the model. The same is true when we make the comparison by marital status (sec-
ond and third rows). Nevertheless, our model replicates well the fact that the inequality
of assets in the married population is slightly lower than in the single population, as
seen in the fourth row of Table 7. The next two statistics of interest in Table 7 (fifth and
sixth rows) are related to the coverage of unemployment benefits. In the US economy,
the average duration of unemployment benefits amounts to 382 months, while in the
model, the number is 306.14 On the other hand, 3916% of the unemployed are covered
by unemployment insurance in the data while the model predicts that 6335% of those
looking for a job take up unemployment benefits.15
13Taken from the companion website of Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2016).
14The data on unemployment duration comes from the FRED database (Saint Louis FED).
15The data is from the US Department of Labor, Employment, and Training Administration.
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Table 3. Data versus model (%). Single females. CPS 2000–2005.
Data Model
From/To E U N From/To E U N
E 9629 155 216 E 9593 162 245
U 2586 5733 1681 U 2208 6250 1542
N 358 193 9450 N 304 191 9505
Unemployment rate 588 Unemployment rate 752
Table 4. Data versus model (%). Single males. CPS 2000–2005.
Data Model
From/To E U N From/To E U N
E 9681 110 209 E 9661 113 227
U 2472 5361 2167 U 2111 6045 1844
N 310 174 9516 N 292 172 9536
Unemployment rate 487 Unemployment rate 567
Table 5. Data versus model (%). Married females. CPS 2000–2005.
Data Model
From/To E U N From/To E U N
E 9760 092 148 E 9808 084 108
U 2988 5658 1353 U 3000 5703 1297
N 337 116 9547 N 367 110 9523
Unemployment rate 296 Unemployment rate 265
Table 6. Data versus model (%). Married males. CPS 2000–2005.
Data Model
From/To E U N From/To E U N
E 9618 077 305 E 9645 083 273
U 2678 4702 2620 U 2358 5342 2300
N 330 113 9557 N 327 126 9547
Unemployment rate 324 Unemployment rate 379
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Figure 1. Asset distribution in the baseline economy by marital status.
The last moment in Table 7 is related to the added worker effect literature.16 We
take the statistic from Mankart and Oikonomou (2016), who run a linear probability
model using transition probabilities of married females from inactivity to either unem-
ployment or employment as a dependent variable on a number of controls. Using data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they find that the coefficient associated to
an employment-to-unemployment transition of the husband is 0076. From our simu-
lated data, we run a probit regression on the same two variables and report the average
marginal effect which is remarkably close at 0075. The fact that the added worker effect
found in our model is consistent with the one measured in the data is relevant for two
reasons. First, it shows that the parametrization of the model is accurate enough to be
consistent with conditional transitions that are not targeted. Second, it indicates that the
assumption of a unitary household and the particular implementation chosen to model
household decisions is consistent with one of the most important margins considered
Table 7. Nontargeted moments.
Data Model
Gini assets 085 073
Gini assets, married 082 070
Gini assets, singles 087 072
Ratio Gini married to singles 094 097
Duration UI benefits (months) 38 31
Unemployed covered by UI (%) 391 633
Added worker effect 0076 0075
16See Lundberg (1985).
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Table 8. Transitions by quintiles (Q) of the asset distribution.
Data Model
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
EU 182 115 087 070 054 EU 120 103 100 094 093
EN 115 092 091 097 109 EN 203 277 027 028 031
UE 088 108 104 110 106 UE 108 102 089 104 091
UN 106 094 099 094 104 UN 142 075 078 081 095
NE 105 134 099 089 084 NE 113 295 050 030 032
NU 179 137 086 063 047 NU 184 075 078 055 058
by the literature regarding joint labor supply. The added worker effect when the female
is the one transiting from employment to unemployment is 0013.17
Besides predictions on average asset allocations and labor market transitions, our
model has implications for the joint determination of savings and labor supply deci-
sions. The performance of our model when compared to the data is observed on Ta-
ble 8. The first five columns are taken directly from Krusell et al. (2017), who use infor-
mation from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) in order to com-
pute joint statistics of labor market transitions by quintiles of the asset distribution. The
numbers in each quintile Q are relative to the overall transition rate in the economy.
For example, the employment to unemployment (EU) transition rate for those house-
holds in the first quintile (Q1) of the asset distribution is 82% higher than the average
EU rate for the economy. As seen from the table, the model does a fair job matching the
data moments. As in Krusell et al. (2017), the model replicates qualitatively the declin-
ing job separation rate EU with respect to assets in the household. It also matches the
nonmonotonic relationship between assets and household decisions to become inac-
tive (EN and UN transitions): as we move from Q1 to Q5, these transitions decline and
then go up.18
5. Implications of unemployment insurance
In this section, we use the calibrated model to compute different counterfactual experi-
ments to understand the effects of changes in UI. All our experiments focus on the same
policy question: we ask what happens, in the steady state, if the generosity of the UI
system changes. Our baseline experiment consists of computing the steady-state equi-
librium of several alternative economies defined over a grid of values of the replacement
rate b in [01].19 For each value of the replacement rate, we modify b proportionally, in
17To the best of our knowledge, there is no literature measuring the added worker effect when the man
is the second earner, the outcome of our model is consistent with priors based on the general role of men
and women in the labor market.
18In Appendix G, Figures 11 and 12, we provide extra exercises with respect to assets.
19That is, for each b we find the level of income taxes that balances the budget of the government and
the prices that satisfy our equilibrium definition of Section 2.5.
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order to obtain the same ratio b/b as in the benchmark economy. In order to have a
reference point, we make sure that the set of replacement rates over which we iterate
contain the value of the replacement ratio of the benchmark calibration (b = 023). Ad-
ditionally, we maintain the level of unconditional transfers T to its equilibrium level in
the benchmark economy of Section 4.
5.1 The role of the family
In what follows, we report comparisons in endogenous variables across steady states
given different generosity levels of the UI system and the implied changes in equilib-
rium prices (w and r) and income taxes (τ).
In the left panel of Figure 2, we show welfare comparisons between the average
household for each type (single males, single females, and married) with respect to
the benchmark steady state (that of b = 023). We perform a steady state to steady
state welfare comparison using the standard notion of consumption equivalent variation
(CEV).20 For example, if the marker in Figure 2(a) is negative for a particular household
type, it means that the average household of that type in the benchmark economy would
need to have its consumption decreased in each time period and state of the world in
order to achieve the same average welfare than its counterpart receives in the alterna-
tive economy. In other words, the alternative economy provides less welfare than the
benchmark does to the average household of this type.21
Figure 2. Changes with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023) of welfare and the
income tax in the baseline experiment (CEV and % change, resp.). Lines fit a cubic spline.
20We focus on steady states comparisons because of two reasons. First, given the size of our model tran-
sition paths between steady states are unreasonably costly to compute. Second, we are interested in how
the family shapes welfare responses. Hence, we do not aim to provide a strict policy evaluation of a partic-
ular UI reform but rather a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between the protection provided by the
family and that provided by the UI.
21For further details, see Appendix A.
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Figure 2(a) shows that, on average, single households are indifferent between the UI
generosity of the benchmark and no UI at all (b = 0).22 Instead, if there is no UI (b = 0),
married households would be slightly better off than in the benchmark. We interpret
the results in Figure 2 as follows. First, the current level of UI is close to being opti-
mal, that is, a reduction of the generosity of UI would lead to minor gains in welfare
and an increase in the level of UI would imply an average welfare loss when compar-
ing steady states. Second, single and married households present very different welfare
responses to changes in UI benefits. A reduction in UI would modestly increase the wel-
fare of married households and leave singles almost indifferent. While both types of
households dislike increases in the UI, married households present bigger losses than
singles.
The main forces that determine the welfare response to a change in the generos-
ity of UI are of the same nature both for married and single households. On the one
hand, a more generous UI implies that it is easier to smooth consumption across time
since in the event of unemployment, the drop in income is lower.23 On the other hand,
a more generous UI implies higher income taxes to finance it. However, apart from the
publicly provided UI, both single and married households can build insurance against
unemployment risk privately. Hence, behind the welfare evaluation of each level of UI
generosity there is an implicit comparison between the cost and the benefit of publicly
providing a given level of UI versus the private alternative.24
For single households, the only private mechanism to self-insure against unemploy-
ment risk is the risk-free asset. However, married households have access to an addi-
tional form of private insurance, in the form of the added worker effect (the family).
Simultaneously, given the parametrization of the model, married agents are less likely
to be unemployed than singles and the probability that a married household has both
agents out of work is lower than the probability that a single agent is not employed.
These two factors rise the question of whether the different response of single and mar-
ried households to changes in the generosity of UI is due to the different private alterna-
tives available to each type of household or to the fact that married agents have better
labor market prospects than singles. To tackle this question, we run a similar policy ex-
periment but now we subject all agents in the economy to the same shocks regarding la-
bor market opportunities. In particular, all agents face the same job-arrival probabilities
(λu and λn) and job-losing probability (δ) as single men. Figure 3 presents the results
of this exercise. Qualitatively, the responses are the same as in the baseline. There are
modest welfare improvements when UI is reduced (mainly for married households) and
22Note that the markers and lines associated to male and female single households are on top of each
other. The precise welfare measures vary slightly although it is difficult to assess it in the graph.
23In Figure 6, in Appendix C, we show the same exercise of changing the generosity of UI but in an econ-
omy in which the UI is not funded through taxes but simply falls from the sky. In that economy, taxes solely
fund the unconditional transfer T so they still change in the same direction as the change in the replace-
ment ratio because a more generous UI implies a lower employment rate, and hence, less taxable income.
In that scenario, all types of households welcome increases in the level of UI.
24Notice that the tax burden changes both because a higher replacement ratio means that each worker
covered by UI is more costly and because less workers are employed, there is less taxable income in the
economy.
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Figure 3. Changes with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023) of welfare and the
income tax (CEV and % change, resp.) when all agents face the same arrival probabilities (λu and
λn) and losing probability (δ) as single men. Lines fit a cubic spline.
there is a significant disparity in the magnitude of the welfare loss between married and
single households when UI becomes more generous. Taken together with the baseline
results (Figure 2), this experiment indicates that despite the fact that single agents face
higher unemployment rates than their married counterparts quantitatively, the insur-
ance inside married households must account for a significant fraction of their different
welfare responses.
The fact that singles are more likely to receive UI payments than married house-
holds (because of higher unemployment rates) while both finance the publicly provided
UI, raises the question of whether the response of each household is shaped by the
implicit cross subsidy from married to single households. To answer this question, in
Appendix D, we run our policy experiment in an economy with only single men. The
welfare response in this bachelor economy is qualitatively identical to the baseline ex-
periment. Another source of heterogeneity is the fact that the benchmark calibration, as
it is the case in the data, assigns a higher level of assets to married households than to
singles in order to match the wealth patterns of the data. In Appendix F, we compare the
results of the baseline experiment in Figure 2(a) to a subsample of married households
which has the same wealth distribution as singles. Even for these married households,
the qualitative welfare response goes in the same direction as in the baseline experi-
ment.
5.2 The heterogeneous responses of labor market stocks
In Figure 4, we plot the employment-to-population ratios and the unemployment rates
under different values of the replacement rate b in order to shed further light in the
mechanisms behind our central result. As expected, overall employment levels decline,
while unemployment increases when the generosity of the UI increases. An impor-
tant implication of the patterns observed in Figure 4 is that the responses of the em-
ployment and unemployment rates for each type of agent are remarkably heteroge-
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Figure 4. Labor market stocks levels in the baseline experiment. Lines fit a cubic spline.
neous. In Figure 5, we report the same data as in Figure 4 but as a percentage change
from the benchmark steady state in which the UI is that of the benchmark calibration
(b = 023).
The patterns in Figure 5 show that focusing only on the aggregate employment or
unemployment rate when analyzing UI programs can mask relevant heterogeneous re-
sponses. Figure 5(a) shows that when the generosity of the UI is decreased, the employ-
ment rate of singles increases while that of married agents decreases. This result reflects
the different mechanisms that dominate the responses of single and married agents. For
singles, a reduction of UI implies that the increase in disposable income due to lower
taxes (see Figure 2(b)) does not compensate the lost income when unemployment hits.
Hence, single agents respond by working more to accumulate more assets. Instead, mar-
ried households respond by working less as their risk of nonemployment is unchanged
with respect to the benchmark economy but they can build the same level of assets (in-
surance) by working slightly less (more post-tax income). When the UI generosity in-
Figure 5. Changes with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023) of the labor market
stocks in the baseline experiment (in %). Lines fit a cubic spline.
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creases, all types of agents respond by working less. However, the magnitude of the re-
sponse is different for each type of agent. A similar pattern is observed in Figure 5(b).
The direction of the change of the unemployment rate with respect to changes to the
generosity of UI is the same across the four types of agents but the slope of the change is
different. In particular, married agents present a much higher change in unemployment
rates than singles.25
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a framework where we make explicit the coexistence of single
and married workers in a labor market with frictions. Our quantitative model is an ex-
tension of a standard incomplete markets model with frictional labor markets and can
replicate the differences in labor market dynamics observed in the US economy across
marital status and gender. We use the model to study the welfare properties of the US
unemployment insurance program and find that the program is valued very differently
depending on marital status. First, married households experience welfare losses (when
comparing steady states) which almost double those experienced by single households
when the unemployment insurance program becomes more generous. Second, married
households have slightly higher welfare if the generosity of the unemployment insur-
ance is reduced while singles are almost indifferent.
We show that the fact that married individuals face lower unemployment risk than
their single counterparts does not drive our result. Instead, the fact that married agents
can rely on the family as an insurance mechanism is what shapes their welfare response.
In our model, the insurance provided by the family is mainly composed by the pooling
of resources between spouses, joint savings, and the added worker effect. We also show
that the responses of the employment and the unemployment rate to changes in the
unemployment insurance are heterogeneous with respect to marital status and gender.
Our results show the importance of studying the interplay between government pro-
vided and private (self) insurance in environments in which the source of private insur-
ance is of heterogeneous nature across agents.
Appendix A: Welfare comparisons
In this section, we discus how we compute aggregate welfare for the steady state of each
economy and how we compare welfare across economies.
For each household type (marital status and gender), we can define a measure of
welfare conditional on current conditions (state variables). For single agents, let us de-
fine





log(ct)− etαSg − stγSg
]

where the left-hand side is defined conditional on the current value of assets, labor
income shock, search cost shock, and UI eligibility. The right-hand side is simply the
25See Appendix G for additional figures on the changes in the wealth inequality, the ratio of wealth be-
tween married and single households, and the capital to labor ratio in our baseline experiment.
460 Choi and Valladares-Esteban Quantitative Economics 11 (2020)
expected discounted sum of per-period utilities, given current states. This formulation
represents the value to an individual of following optimal policies for consumption (and
savings) as well as employment and search decisions, given the aggregate government
policies with respect to taxation and UI.
Similarly, for married households, let us define
WMg
(











− eftαMf − emtαMm − eftemtαM
− sftγMf − smtγMm
]

which, given our unitary household assumption, represents both the welfare of the fe-
male and the male inside a married unit conditional on the aggregate conditions of the
economy.
Given these definitions, one can define the average welfare (for each household type)
as the average value of the above value functions given the steady state distributions
of agents in each tuple: (a zγ i) for singles and (a z z∗γγ∗ i i∗) for married. If we
do this for the benchmark economy (replacement rate of b = 023), we can label the
resulting values as W0, where we drop the conditional on household type for ease of
exposition. For any alternative set of government policies, we can define W1.
To compare average welfare between two different economies, we use the standard
notion of a consumption equivalent variation (CEV): how much extra consumption (at
each point in time) a household needs to receive in order for them to be indifferent
between two alternative economies.26 Given the assumption of log utility, this leads to
the following equation (for a generic type of household):
W0 + log(1 + CEV)(1 −β) = W1
⇒ CEV = exp{(W1 −W0)(1 −β)} − 1
When we derive this equation for married households, we consider the CEV as being
net of the influence of the minimum consumption requirement c and the equivalence
scale φ.
Appendix B: Computation
As described in Section 2, the computation of a steady state in our model involves the
endogenous determination of a wage rate (w), an interest rate (r), a level of lump-sum
transfers (T ), and an average productivity level (z) which determines the cap on UI ben-
efits. Given the Cobb–Douglas production function, we assume for firms, the capital-
labor ratio (KL ) is a sufficient statistic to compute prices. Given a set of parameters, the
steps we follow to find a steady state are:27
26See Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) and Domeij and Klein (2013) for examples of welfare calcu-
lations involving unitary households.
27All codes can be found in the Supplementary Material (Choi and Valladares-Esteban (2020)).
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1. Guess a capital-labor ratio, a lump-sum transfer, and an average level of productiv-
ity.
2. Find the policy and value functions that solve the problem of single males, single
females, and married households. For all three problems, we use the value function it-
eration method:
(a) Set a grid for all state variables. For assets, we use a grid of 55 points for all house-
holds. For productivity shocks, we use a grid of 17 points for single households and 9
points for each member of a married household (81 grid points in total to consider for
couples). By definition, the search shock has 3 grid points (9 for couples) and the status
of the UI benefits is binary for all agents.
(b) Set an arbitrary value for all value functions.
(c) Iterate over all combinations of the discretized state variable values and compute
the optimal level of asset accumulation. We use the Rouwenhurst method (see Kopecky
and Suen (2010)) to discretize the AR(1) process for income shocks. We compute the
optimal level of assets for each combination of state variable values using the golden-
section search technique.
(d) Iterate on step (c) until the value and policy functions converge.
3. Use the policy and value functions to find a stationary distribution. We use a Monte
Carlo simulation with 10,000 agents and 5001 periods for each type of household.
4. Compute aggregate moments from the output of the stationary distribution. We
use the weights of each type of household to compute the simulated aggregate capital-
labor ratio, the lump-sum transfer implied by the budget constraint of the government,
and the average productivity shock of the economy.
5. Use the computed values from step 4 to update guesses from step 1.
6. Keep repeating all previous steps until the difference between the guessed equilib-
rium values and the outcome of step 4 is below a predetermined tolerance level.
Appendix C: Unfunded changes in UI generosity
In this section, we run an experiment in which we use the same parametrization as in
our baseline experiment but we change the source of founding of the UI. In this experi-
ment, the burden of the UI does not appear in the budget constraint of the government
but UI payments are transferred to the agents that fulfill the eligibility criteria. An alter-
native interpretation is that b is a backyard technology which provides extra consump-
tion goods to individuals in the case of unemployment.
Nevertheless, the tax rate (τ) in this economy changes with changes in UI because,
as in the baseline experiment, the government needs to finance a fixed level of uncondi-
tional transfers (T ) of the benchmark economy, but the overall taxable income changes
due to changes in the number of workers employed. In other words, although the tax
burden of the UI is not existent in this economy, its effects regarding the (dis)incentives
to work are still present.
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Figure 6. Experiments when changing benchmark UI generosity (b = 023). UI not founded
through income taxes. CEV for welfare, % change for taxes, and stocks for employment and un-
employment. Lines fit a cubic spline.
Appendix D: The single-agent (bachelor) economy
In this section, we perform the same policy analysis as in our baseline experiment, but
we focus on an economy populated only by single men. We take their calibrated parame-
ters from our benchmark calibration and keep the equilibrium conditions of our bench-
mark economy. That is, the unconditional transfer (T ) and equilibrium prices are set to
the same level as the benchmark economy while the income tax (τ) changes throughout
the different levels of the UI level to balance the budget of the government.
As seen in Figure 7, welfare changes from increasing replacement rates b are similar
but not identical to our main exercise in Figure 2 in the main text.
Appendix E: General versus partial equilibrium
In this section, we compare results of performing the same policy analysis as in the main
body of the text, but focusing on general equilibrium effects. In Figures 8 and 9, we com-
pare how welfare changes when replacement rates b change, when we abstract or not
from general equilibrium considerations.
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Figure 7. Changes with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023) in welfare and in-
come tax (CEV and in % change, resp.) when the economy is only populated by single men.
Lines fit a cubic spline.
In both figures, the left panel has the “partial equilibrium” case, where we maintain
equilibrium prices (wages w and the interest rate r) as in the benchmark economy with
b = 023. Panels on the right show what happens when equilibrium prices are allowed to
move to equilibrate labor and asset markets.
As seen in Figure 9, the qualitative results for the baseline experiments for our pro-
posed model do not change with the introduction of general equilibrium effects, while
the quantitative effects are increased by movements in equilibrium prices: the welfare
losses become bigger than in the case with partial equilibrium.
For the case of the bachelor economy in Figure 8, welfare loses with general equi-
librium effects are not monotonic with respect to changes in b, showing a reversal at
around b = 08. Equilibrium effects in the bachelor economy kick in when a sufficiently
high fraction of individuals decides to stop working: the scarcity of workers pushes up
Figure 8. CEV with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023) when the economy is
only populated by single men (in %). Lines fit a cubic spline.
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Figure 9. CEV with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023) for economies where
prices adjust given general equilibrium in each alternative economy or are left fixed at the base-
line values (partial economy figures). Lines fit a cubic spline.
real wages which increases UI payments to those eligible (given the dependence of the
benefit cap b on average wages), increasing average welfare for high levels of b. This re-
versal in average welfare changes is not present for our benchmark economy, given the
smoother movement in aggregate employment, given heterogeneous labor supply.
Appendix F: Changes in UI benefits, controlling for assets
Our baseline economy is designed to replicate the ratio of assets between married and
single households. This is clearly depicted in Figure 1. The higher level of savings inside
married households allows them to be better insured if one of the members becomes
unemployed.
Figure 10. Average welfare levels and CEV with respect to the benchmark UI generosity
(b= 023) for a simulated sample where average household assets are equalized. Lines fit a cubic
spline.
Quantitative Economics 11 (2020) On households and unemployment insurance 465
Figure 10 depicts an exercise where we control for the amount of household assets
when making comparisons between single and married households. Following the pro-
cedure in Angrist (1998), for each steady state of our baseline experiment, we compute
average welfare for singles and married individuals by deciles of the asset distribution
of their own groups. We then reweigh the sample of singles and married agents in each
decile in order to equalize the average asset in the decile across marital groups. After-
wards, we compute the group average using the reweighed sample and perform our
comparisons.
Appendix G: Additional figures
Figure 11. Changes with respect to the benchmark UI generosity (b = 023). Lines fit a cubic
spline.
Figure 12. Ratio between married and single households’ asset levels.
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Krusell, P., T. Mukoyama, and A. Şahin (2010), “Labor-market matching with precaution-
ary savings and aggregate fluctuations.” Review of Economic Studies, 77 (4), 1477–1507.
[440]
Kuhn, M. and J. Ríos-Rull (2016), “2013 update on the U.S. earnings, income, and wealth
distributional facts: A view from macroeconomics.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review, 37 (1), 1–75. [448, 451]
Landais, C., P. Michaillat, and E. Saez (2018a), “A macroeconomic approach to optimal
unemployment insurance: Theory.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10
(2), 152–181. [439]
Landais, C., P. Michaillat, and E. Saez (2018b), “A macroeconomic approach to optimal
unemployment insurance: Applications.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
10 (2), 182–216. [439]
468 Choi and Valladares-Esteban Quantitative Economics 11 (2020)
Lentz, R. (2009), “Optimal unemployment insurance in an estimated job search model
with savings.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 12 (1), 37–57. [439]
Lifschitz, A., O. Setty, and Y. Yedid-Levi (2018), “On the provision of unemployment in-
surance when workers are ex-ante heterogeneous.” Report. [440]
Lundberg, S. (1985), “The added worker effect.” Journal of Labor Economics, 3 (1), 11–37.
[438, 453]
Mankart, J. and R. Oikonomou (2016), “Household search and the aggregate labour mar-
ket.” Review of Economic Studies, 84 (4), 1735–1788. [441, 453]
McCall, J. J. (1970), “Economics of information and job search.” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 84 (1), 113–126. [441]
Mukoyama, T. (2013), “Understanding the welfare effects of unemployment insurance
policy in general equilibrium.” Journal of Macroeconomics, 38, 347–368. [440]
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